Introduction
I was asked to consider the impact of Industrial Organization on recent research in macroeconomics. This is a di¢ cult question for at least two reasons. In the …rst place, macroeconomics is probably one of the broadest areas in economics so its boundaries are hard to de…ne. Research ranges from abstract theory to very applied work, traditional topics such as Monetary economics, Business Cycles and Growth, to others in labor economics, public …nance, education, health, international, development, contract theory and many others. Modern macro is de…ned both on the basis of some central questions as by the application of a common methodology to many di¤erent areas, combining dynamics and some general equilibrium concept.
IO is not an easy …eld to de…ne either, ranging also from abstract theory to very applied work and a broad set of questions relating to the behavior of …rms and markets: pricing decisions, determinants of market structure, entry and exit, productivity, research and development, advertising,etc. Most research has taken the form of partial equilibrium analysis in game theoretic settings, combined with important advances in applied econometrics and a recent tendency to focus on narrowly de…ned empirical studies that do not lend easily to aggregation. [Peltzman, 1991] famous critique pointed to "the seeming inability of the recent theory to lead to any powerfuld generarlizaton...an almost interminable series of special cases...", suggesting as an explanation the "gulf between theory and empirical work." The response of recent new empirical inducstrial organization has also generated skepticism about the possibility of generalization. As pointed out by [Sutton, 1995] , this recent literature Many As someone that that lingers in the boundaries of these two broad areas, you run the risk -as happens to me frequently-to be considered "not IO enough" by some and "not macro enough" by others. I will make no attempt here to convice others that I am IO enough or Macro enough but instead take a view through this narrower window where I stand and focus on Firm Dynamics and some of its implications for Macroeconomics. This work is at the nexus of a central interest to IO -the behavior of …rms and markets-and one central to Macroeconomics -the determinants of aggregate productivity.
In his discussion about the state of Industrial Organization, [Sutton, 1995] argues the need for:
... sharp empirical regularities arising over a wide cross-section of industries. That such regularities appear in spite of the fact that every industry has many idiosyncratic features suggests that they are molded by some highly robust competitive mechanisms -and if this is so, then these would seem to be mechanisms that merit careful study. If ideas from the IO …eld are to have relevance in other areas of economics, such as International Trade or Growth Theory, that relevance is likely to derive from mechanisms of this robust kind...
It is thus not surprising that one of the areas of greater intersection between IO and macro -as indicated in the analysis in Appendix 9-is precisely an area relating to Market structure and Size distribution of …rms. I will describe in this paper a body of theoretical and empirical work that focuses on regularities suggested by Sutton that provides the …rm-microstrucutre foundations of the aggregate production function and aggregate productivity.
Economists have long been interested in …rm dynamics and the size distribution of …rms. The turnover of …rms and reallocation of factors of production has been an inseparable part of the history of industrialization and the development of a market economy. In the early part of the century, [Viner, 1932] emphasized the role of economies of scale as a determinant researchers ....natural response .... focus on some speci…c market ... 'ultra-micro' work ....led to a growing skepticism about the value of searching for statistical regularities that hold across a broad run of di¤erent industries..." This concern is also echoed by [Schmalensee, 1989] , "...inter-industry research in industrial organization should generally be viewed as a search for empirical regularities, not as a set of exercises in structural estimation." of …rm size. This came out also as an important determinant of market structure, together with sunk costs, in the extensive empirical work by [Bain, 1951] [Bain, 1954] [Bain, 1956] ) and others. [Lucas Jr, 1978] classic paper was the …rst to derive size distribution from an economic model as the solution to the problem of optimally allocating resources to managers with di¤erent talents. As in Viner, this theory relies on economies of scale given by the indivisibility of managers and decreasing returns on capital and labor for a given …rm, resulting in the analogue to the classic U-shaped average cost curve. In contrast to Viner that focused at the industry level, Lucas interprets his results as applying to the size distribution of …rms in general. Lucas'model -or variants of this type-are now the standard way of modeling the …rm size distribution.
The interest of applied economists on the size distribution of …rms was accompanied by a parallel interest in …rm dynamics: stochastic growth, entry and exit of …rms. [Gibrat, 1931] law of proportionate growth stating that …rm growth is independent of …rm size, is a cornerstone of …rm dynamics and is used frequently as an assumption in the building of economic models.
2 [Hart and Prais, 1956] , [Simon and Bonini, 1958] and [Adelman, 1958] derived with great success size distribution as the stationary distribution of a process of idiosyncratic shocks to …rm size. [Jovanovic, 1982] was the …rst paper to develop an economic model of …rm dynamics that is motivated by these and other facts. His model of selection provides a very elegant and persuasive darwinian story to explain …rm dynamics. Firms learn about their underlying value, as productivity shocks are drawn from a distribution with unknown and …rm-idiosyncratic mean. Firm size is determined by the posterior mean of this shock and as it changes over time, …rms adjust their sizes. Among other implications, the model predicts a decline in the variance of growth rates and the hazard rates for exit of …rms as a function of age, which has been extensively con…rmed by a large body of empirical work. 3 Jovanovic's model gives a non-stationary process for …rm size which in the limit converges to a …xed value, and in the long run there is no entry 2 The large accumulated evidence on …rm dynamics suggests that …rm size is a highly persistent stochastic process, but with some degree of mean reversion. See [Sutton, 1997] . 3 See [Dunne et al., 1988] , [Dunne et al., 1989b] , [Dunne et al., 1989a] , [Davis et al., 1998 ], [Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992] , [Evans, 1987b] , [Leonard, 1988] , [Evans, 1987a] , [Hall, 1987] , [Geroski, 1995] , [Caves, 1998] and exit. In spite of the model's appeal, it lacks the tractability to be used as a microfoundation for aggregate productivity, in the way Lucas' model has been utilized. [Hopenhayn, 1992a] incorporates entry and exit and …rm dynamics in a tractable way in a Lucas-type model, assuming productivity shocks follow a Markov process with a well de…ned and non-degenerate limiting distribution. The stochastic process assumed on the shocks is in the spirit of the early empirical papers cited above. Firm size is determined each period in a similar fashion to Lucas, as the solution to the problem of allocating resources to …rms to maximize total output. Entry and exit are also determined as part of a stationary equilibrium. This model and other variants have been used extensively as …rm-microstructure in many recent papers in macroeonomics. The work by Davis and Haltiwanger and others, had a tremendous impact by considerably extending the interest on job creation and destruction and the importance of …rm microstructure among macroeconomists. This work and the work of followers, greatly contributed to an established view on the economic relevance of reallocation as a determinant of aggregate productivity and in this way established the relevance of …rm micro-structure in macroeonomics. [Hopenhayn and Rogerson, 1993] was the …rst paper to assess the quantitative importance of reallocation for aggregate productivity by analyzing the cost of policies that restrict labor mobility. Firing costs introduce a wedge between the marginal products of labor across …rms and have thus an impact on aggregate productivity. A calibrated general equilibrium version of [Hopenhayn, 1992a] is used to provide a quanti…cation. The methodology developed to incorporate …rm heterogeneity in a general equilibrium macro model had probably a more widespread impact in macroeconomics than the reallocation analysis itself.
Firing costs in [Hopenhayn and Rogerson, 1993] introduce a wedge between the marginal products of di¤erent …rms that explains productivity losses. More recently, there is a growing literature in macro/development that evaluates the impact of wedges to marginal products, taking a more agnostic view of where these wedges come from. The aim of this literature is to learn of the potential e¤ects of …rm level misallocation on aggregate productivity. [Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008] was the …rst paper to address this question by evaluating the impact of di¤erent distributions of wedges -modelled as implicit taxes/subsidies-on TFP. [Hsieh and Klenow, 2009] develop an empirical methodology to compute this distribution and used it to perform a decomposition of TFP di¤erences between India, China and the US, estab-lishing the quantitative importance of these distortions. 4 , 5 The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes a simpli…ed version of a Lucas-type model and provides the key link between the aggregate production function and the …rm microstructure. Section 3 generalizes this approach to an economy with …rm dynamics, entry and exit. Section 4 provides a summary of empirical regularities on …rm dynamics and the size distribution of …rms. Section 5 considers an economy with distortions. Section 6 reviews the results on the quantitative analysis of distortions discussed above. Section 7 considers implications of …rm-microstructure on the macro response to aggregate shocks. Section 8 concludes.
A simpli…ed Lucas model
There is a collection of …rms i = 1; :::M , with production functions
The only input is labor, and the total endowment in the economy is N: As in [Lucas Jr, 1978] , each …rm has decreasing returns to scale.
An optimal allocation solves
The …rst order conditions for this problem imply that
where a is a constant that depends on ; N and the vector of …rm level 4 This is a growing literature and there are many papers.
As an example, [Guner et al., 2008] and [Alfaro et al., 2007] . 5 A related research has developed in international economics. A series of recent papers (see [Melitz, 2003] ), [Eaton and Kortum, 2002] , [Bernard et al., 2003] and [Alvarez and Lucas, 2007] ) consider the e¤ect of tari¤s as barriers to the e¢ cient allocation of resources across the world. The spirit of the exercise and overall methodology is very similar to [Hopenhayn and Rogerson, 1993]. productivities. Substituting in the production function,
= a + 1 1 ln e i is also proportional to e i , implying that at the e¢ cient allocation y i =n i = y=n for all i: Finally, using the aggregate resource constraint to substitute for a; it follows that
This is an aggregate production function of the same class as the underlying …rm-level production function, with TFP parameter given by
This technology exhibits decreasing returns in the aggregate, as …rms here are treated as a …xed factor. This can be more clearly seen, dividing the …rst term by M 1 y = Ee
This aggregate production function has constant returns to scale in …rms and other inputs (in our example, labor), where aggregate TFP is a geometric mean of …rm level productivity.
Endogenizing entry
Suppose that c e workers are need to create a …rm with productivity that is randomly drawn from a cdf G; independently for all entrants. A competitive equilibrium is de…ned as follows. In the …rst stage, a large mass of identical potential entrants decide whether to enter or not. An entrant must pay the cost of entry given by c e units of labor and then draws its productivity e according to a cdf G: Assuming there is a large number of entrants and that draws of potential entrants are independent, the distribution of realizations is approximately given by G: Entry decisions are driven by the expected pro…ts of a …rm E (w) = R (e; w) G (de) ; where (e; w) = max n en wn: In equilibrium, E (w) = c e w.
In this simple economy, the welfare theorems hold so equilibrium and Pareto optimal allocations -those that maximize total output-coincide. For …xed number of …rms we constructed an equilibrium and optimal allocation in the previous section. The optimal choice of number of …rms solves:
subject to: c e M + N e N The solution to this problem is N e = N , the number of …rms M = and the equilibrium wage is the multiplier of the constraint. The corresponding production function in terms of the labor endowment is given by:
Interestingly, it turns out that in this case the number of …rms is independent of the distribution of productivity shocks.
Given the aggregate production function above, total output will be split between wages and …rm pro…ts with shares and (1 ) ; respectively, and the equilibrium entry condition E (w) = R (e; w) G (de) = wc e is veri…ed. Results here generalize naturally to the case where …rms have production function y = e i k 1 i n i just by substituting K 1 N for N in the above expressions. For the endogenous entry case, this assumes that the relevant input for entry is a composite of capital and labor with weights and 1 :
Connection to monopolistic competition
In a monopolistically competitive economy [Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977] : Hence we can rewrite the expression for equation (3) as
These are the familiar equations (see [Melitz, 2003] ) for the monopolistically competitive case. Note that for …xed M aggregate T F P is the same (given the transformation of the e 0 i s) as in the perfectly competitive case, and the only di¤erence remains in the increasing returns to scale in M; N:
A sequence economy
In this section we add dynamics to the evolution of …rms. Suppose that all …rms productivities follow a Markov Process with transition function given by the conditional cdf F (ds 0 ; s) : Again assuming that the stochastic processes faced by …rms are independent, repeated application of the transition function on the distribution of entrants generates a sequence of probability measures~ s for …rms of age s: We also assume that there is a fraction of …rms die exogenously every period.
The aggregation results from the previous sections apply, so
6 A more satisfying procedure is to have endogenous exit, as in several papers in the literature. The exogenous death rate simpli…es considerably the analysis and is commonly used to obtain a well de…ned steady state with entry and exit of …rms. The planner's problem for this economy is:
To de…ne a competitive equilibrium, let v t (e; w) denote the value for a …rm at time t for a given sequence of wages w = fw s g 1 s=0 : This value satis…es the following recursive equation:
Let v e t = R v t (e; w) dG (e) w t c e denote the expected value for an entrant.
De…nition 1 A competitive equilibrium is a sequence fm t ; n t (e) ; v t g and wages fw t g that satisfy the following conditions:
1. Employment decisions are optimal given wages 2. The value functions are as de…ned above 4. m t c e + R n t (e) t (de) = N Condition 3 is the free entry condition and assumes that there is an unlimited number of ex-ante identical potential entrants. If there is positive entry, then the value of entry has to be exactly equal to zero. Equation 4 is the labor market clearing condition. The analysis can be easily extended to a growing population.
Stationary equilibrium
Firms in this model can be thought as pieces of capital with idiosyncratic productivity. In the same spirit as a steady state (or balanced growth path) in a Solow type model, we can de…ne here a stationary equilibrium. In a stationary equilibrium all allocations are stationary and in particular the entry ‡ow m t = m for all t: This implies that the total mass of …rms M = m 1 and the probability distribution over types is given by:
that is, a weighted mixture of the distribution of cohorts of di¤erent ages, weighted by the corresponding survival probability. In a stationary equilibrium wages are constant and the value of …rms given by:
which gives also an employment decision rule n (e) : The de…nition of a stationary equilibrium follows immediately from the general conditions of an equilibrium plus the requirement of stationarity in prices and allocations.
Proposition 2 There exists a unique stationary equilibrium.
The calculation is very straightforward using the condition for an entrant v e (w) = 0 that pins down a unique equilibrium wage. Total labor demand is given by:
so there is a unique value m that clears the market.
Endogenous Exit
The model given above is a simpli…ed version of [Hopenhayn, 1992a] , where exit is exogenous Assume instead that there is no exogenous death ( = 0) but …rms must pay every period a …xed cost f in units of labor. Hopenhayn shows that the stationary equilibrium will be characterized by an exit threshold e such that all …rms with e it < e exit the market. The aggregation procedure given above can be carried out with the simple modi…cation that now~ s is interpreted as the distribution of shocks for age s cohort -that is conditional on survival for s periods-and total mass equal to the survival rate. The exit rule described above gives a stopping time ; that corresponds to the age at exit. [Hopenhayn, 1992b] shows that a stationary equilibrium exists if and only if the expectation E < 1; and in that case the rate of entry/exit in the economy is simply 1=E and thus only depends on the exit threshold e. [Hopenhayn, 1992a] and [Hopenhayn, 1992b] show that the exit threshold is decreasing in the cost of entry c e and, under some mild regularity conditions increasing in the …xed cost f:
General equilibrium or partial equilibrium
The standing framework in macroeconomics is general equilibrium, while in Industrial Organization it is partial equilibrium. It turns out that within the model described above, there is not much di¤erence. Indeed, consider an industry where …rms produce an homogenous good according to the technology given above in a perfectly competitive setting. Suppose wage is exogenous to the industry and normalize it to one. The zero pro…t condition for entrants gives a price p which is the inverse of the wage rate w obtained in the general equilibrium version. The mass of …rms is chosen to equate demand and supply. All implications for …rm dynamics and aggregate productivity are exactly the same.
Empirical regularities and calibration
Over the last twenty years there has been an abundance of empirical papers documenting …rm and employment dynamics. This section provides a very brief summary of …ndings.
1. The size distribution of …rms and establishments is highly skewed. In particular, the size distribution for the US follows approximately a Pareto distribution with coe¢ cient minus one, i.e.
This is consistent with Zipf's law, by which the size of the n th …rm in ranking is proportional to 1=n. As shown in the Figure 1 from RossiHansberg and Wright, the actual distribution has a smaller tail than the Pareto and a larger number of very small …rms. A Pareto distribution of sizes can be generated as the limiting distribution of a process for …rm size where …rm dynamics exhibits scale independence. Such a process was postulated by [Gibrat, 1931] and is known as Gibrat's law. Recent empirical work (xxx) has established that, at least conditioning on survival, small …rms tend to grow faster than large …rms, so there is a moderate degree of mean reversion.
2. Firm size is persistent, but the variance of the innovations are quite large. Gross reallocation of employment across …rms exceeds in several orders of magnitude net reallocation (Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh xxx) The variance of growth rates declines with size and age. 4. There is considerable degree of entry and exit, as documented in [Dunne et al., 1988] , [Dunne et [Davis et al., 1998 ], [Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992] , [Evans, 1987b] , [Leonard, 1988] , [Evans, 1987a] , [Hall, 1987] , [Geroski, 1995] , [Caves, 1998] 5. Most of the …rm level changes in employment respond to idiosyncratic shocks, i.e. they cannot be explained by aggregate, geographic or industry variables.
The model and the data
The model described above provides a simple structure to assess quantitatively the costs of di¤erent potential distortions. Starting with [Hopenhayn and Rogerson, 1993] , most papers in the literature calibrate the model to the US manufacturing sector, under the assumption that there are no distortions. In static versions of the model, there is a one-to-one relationship between the size distribution of …rms and the distribution of productivity shocks. To calibrate a dynamic version, [Hopenhayn and Rogerson, 1993] use data on …rm employment dynamics as follows. Assume the ln e it follows an AR1 process
where " it is an iid process, normally distributed with mean zero and variance 2 : Using equation (1) it follows that:
This implies that ln n it also follows an AR1 process with the same persistence and normally distributed innovations with zero mean and variance 2 = (1 ) 2 : Parameters ; a + e 1 and 2 = (1 ) 2 can be estimated using panel data on …rm employment. The parameter equals labor share. The distribution G for the initial draw of …rms can be inferred from the size distribution of entrants, up to an endogenous scale parameter a that is monotonically decreasing in the equilibrium wage rate. This leaves three more parameters to calibrate, namely the cost of entry c e ; …xed cost f and e: There is clearly an identi…cation problem between a and e as they enter additively in the determination of average employment. Hence there is an extra degree of freedom and an arbitrary value of a can be chosen, without any meaningful implications.
Implications for macroeconomics
As our aggregation exercise shows, …rm level productivities are a key determinant of aggregate TFP. The data suggests that there is considerable variation in …rm level productivities/demand and a high degree of resource ‡ows across …rms. Misallocation of resources could thus be a potentially important explanation of the wide di¤erences in TFP across countries. Recent papers have tried to establish the relevance of this source of variation, suggesting it can be quite large. In particular, barriers to the reallocation of resources can also be a potentially important source of di¤erences in TFP. Sections6 will discuss recent papers in this area. The heterogeneity in …rm growth rates can also have implications for transitional dynamics. In particular, the process of growth of …rms with age leads to "time to build" in the aggregate and can have implications for the evolution of investment and productivity after large shocks hit the economy. This is discussed in Section 7. 
The distorted economy
This section analyzes the consequences of deviations from the optimal allocation of resources across productive units. Figure 2 provides a useful picture of the type of distortions that might occur:The solid line shows an optimal allocation, where ln n i is a linear function of e i : The dotted lines illustrate two types of distortions:
1. n i not equal for all …rms with the same e i ; termed uncorrelated distortions;
2. average ln n i (e) 6 = a + 1 1 e; termed correlated distortions, in the case of Figure 2 it is a distortion that results in reallocation of labor from more to less productive …rms.
Both of these distortions result in losses of productivity as marginal product (or the marginal value of labor) is not equated across productive units. As an accounting device, it is useful to model these distortions as …rm-speci…c implicit taxes/subsidies that create a wedge between its revenues and output:
where is a constant that depends only on the equilibrium wage. Equilibrium in this economy will be identical in terms of allocations to the equilibrium of an undistorted economy where the distribution of …rm productivities is changed to e i (1 i ) : Total revenues are given by
and total output
Using equations (7) and (8), it follows that
Interestingly, note that in the static case, if a planner were to choose optimally the entry of …rms subject to the existing employment decisions, the choice would be independent of the distortions.
7 Indeed, it can also be shown that the equilibrium entry decisions would give rise to exactly the same number of …rms. These results are not true in general for the sequence economy. Suppose the joint distribution of implicit taxes and e¢ ciency for …rms of age s is~ s (de; d ) and letr
be the average revenue-productivity. Hopenhayn (2010) shows that in a stationary equilibrium for the distorted economy, the equilibrium number of …rms is determined by:
N c e m = c e (1 )
Proposition 3 (Hopenhayn, 2010) If = 1; the equilibrium number of …rms and the optimal number of …rms are independent of distortions.
The …rst part of this proposition follows directly from equation (10); the second is derived in Hopenhayn (2010) . Equation (10) Again, the …rst part of the Proposition follows immediately from the above equation. Aside from these extreme cases, the net e¤ect of distortions on entry depends on the speci…c age patterns. A su¢ cient condition for distortions to lead to more (less) entry is given below. Then m ( )m 0 :
Finally, an even stronger su¢ cient condition is that r s =r s ( ) r s+1 =r s+1 ; which says that distortions are relatively larger (smaller) for older cohorts. An economy that bene…ts relatively established …rms (e.g. as a consequence of their increased lobby power) will have less …rms in equilibrium. Alternatively, an economy that tends to subsidize smaller …rms will have the opposite e¤ect, taking into account the well established fact that …rm size increases with age. 
Quantitative analysis of distortions
The above framework has been used to asess the quantitative impact of distortions. The …rst paper to do that was [Hopenhayn and Rogerson, 1993] , that studies the e¤ect of layo¤ costs. A baseline model is calibrated using US …rm dynamics data as indicated in section 4.1. Layo¤ costs are introduced to this benchmark as follows. Assume that there is a cost f of …ring a worker. The value of a …rm with n 0 workers and productivity shock e is given by the following Bellman equation:
The solution to this problem is an s S type policy that can be easily characterized by two increasing functions n L (e) n H (e) with the following interpretation. Suppose a …rm enters a period with employment n 0 : I chooses employment n in the current period according to the following rule:
3. If n L (e) n 0 n H Figure 3 is an example of an sS policy. The lower line corresponds to n L (e) ; the upper line to n H (e) and the middle line to the optimal employment with no distortions, that is always in between the other two. Firing costs put a wedge to the downward adjustment of employment, that explains the partial nature of assumptions. The wedge on the upward adjustment to n L (e) is explained by the anticipated expected …ring taxes and the resulting option value of delaying adjustment.
Firing costs and implicit wedges
The history of productivity shocks of a …rm, through repeated application of this employment policy, determines the current employment of the …rm. A stationary equilibrium implies a joint distribution of productivity/employment levels and consequently an aggregate level of TFP as discussed in the previous sections. Firms with employment below the undistorted level -the one given by the middle line in Figure 3 -have a positive implicit ; while those with employment above the unconstrained level have negative :
In order to get better insight on the nature of distortions that are generated from layo¤ costs, consider the following hypothetical example. Let there be three levels of productivity e 1 < e 2 < e 3 and suppose the corresponding employment thresholds are n L = f5; 8; 14g ; n H = f9; 12; 20g and the unconstrained employment levels n = f7; 10; 18g : Suppose the Markov process governing …rms'productivities has the property that any level of productivity can be reached after some time with positive probability from any other level of productivity. This process generates a long run distribution with the following support: fe 1; 9g ; fe 2 ; 9g ; fe 2 ; 12g ; fe 3 ; 14g :
The explanation is quite simple: 1) eventually state e 3 is reached and employment increases to 14: Once it reaches this level, it can only approach state e 1 from above n H and so only n = 9 will be observed for …rms with productivity e 1 ; 2) since state e 3 is approached only from below, employment n = 14 is the only compatible level in the long run for e 3 ; 3) state e 2 can be reached from state e 1 or e 3 : In the …rst case, employment will be 9 and in the second case 12:
This implies that employment will be above the optimal level for e 1 and below for e 2 , as if …rms in e 1 faced a subsidy and those in e 3 a tax, hence a positive correlation of wedges. On the other hand, there will be …rms with two implicit tax levels in state e 2 ; corresponding to a variance of wedges.
In order to get a quantitative order for these wedges consider the following variant of [Hopenhayn and Rogerson, 1993] , with no entry and exit. Let
where e it is a lognormally distributed iid shock across …rms and time with mean zero and variance 2 ;where = 0:92 consistent with …rm level employment in the US and a time unit of 5 years, 2 is chosen to match the standard deviation of e it in the US (from [Hsieh and Klenow, 2009] ) , e generates an average size of …rms with 50 workers in the undistorted economy similar to the US level. Take a …ring cost f equal to two years of wages, which is not an unreasonable mean value for countries with such type of regulations. Figure 3 shows precisely th sS policy corresponding to the equilibrium of this economy. The solid lower and upper lines are the N L and N H boundaries. The middle line corresponds to the zero …ring cost optimal employment level. The dashed lines show the restriction of the boundary decision rules to the support of the stationary distribution of productivity/employment states. As can be readily seen, there is a wide range of employment values between the two boundaries. Table 1 illustrates the range for a few values. The ratio of N H =N L is extremely high, reaching almost a six-fold value. This employment range can be rationalized by taxes and subsidies to employment as described above. The tax gap, re ‡ecting the di¤erence between implicitly subsidy and tax rates for a given level of productivity, ranges from 15% to 27%.
These gaps might seem substantial, but what are their implications for aggregate TFP? Table xxx provides an answer to this question: the level of …ring costs that we have considered (f=2 years) results in a 2.8% reduction in TFP. If f = 5 years, the TFP loss is 7.5% and if f = 25 years, it is 24.3%. This level of …ring cost is close to prohibitive and …rms respond by not adjusting employment at all. With such degree of …ring costs, it seems very likely that …rms would negotiate and bargain with workers and induce quits in order to get around these barriers to adjustment. Hence a moderate range of …ring costs seems a more plausible realistic scenario for employment rigidity and consequent TFP losses.
Firing cost (years) TFP loss Gap (range of equivalent labor taxes) 2 years -2.8% 32.9 5 years -7.5% 56.0 25 years -24.3% 97.6
Firing costs are an example of the very subtle connection that might appear between policies and implicit wedges. We discussed above the distinction between covariance and variance wedges. Figures 4 and 5 provide such kind of decomposition for the case of …ring costs. More precisely, Figure 4 gives the average implicit tax rate for each level of productivity. The positive slope indicates positive covariance which increases substantially with …ring costs. To provide some intuition for this result, consider the case where …ring costs are in…nite. Firms would then target a …xed employment level to maximize long run expected pro…ts targeting the employment level for an average productivity shock (this would be exact without any discounting). As a consequence, there will be excessive employment for low productivity shocks and too little employment for high ones. Figure 5 shows the variance of wedges for each level of productivity. The variance is larger for intermediate levels of productivity. This can be understood observing Figure 3 . While the width of the bands does not seem to change much with productivity, the boundaries for the support of the long run joint distribution of productivity/employment -given by the dotted linesget narrower for low and high shocks. This is partly due to the bounded support for productivity shocks used in the calculations, but also re ‡ects the e¤ect of mean reversion (recall that the AR1 coe¢ cient used is 0.92.) The strength of this variance e¤ect is also non monotonic in …ring costs. This is also intuitive: for zero …ring costs there is no variance since the optimal level of employment is targeted for each level of productivity; for very large …ring costs employment hardly changes and is set at a constant level consistent with average long run productivity.
To get a quantitative idea of the role of variance and covariance in explaining the gap in TFP, we calculate the percentage gap closed if variance were set arbitrarily to zero by putting employment at the average level for each shock. The relative importance of variance shocks decreases with …ring costs: 64% of the gap is closed when f = 1; 41% when f = 5 and zero when f = 25:
The model calibrated in this section has no entry and exit. This might a¤ect somewhat the results. Though most of the employment adjustment takes place for incumbent …rms, young …rms are the ones that exhibit highest variance of innovations. Including entry in the model would change …rm demographics, generating in steady state a cross section of di¤erent aged …rms as we have described above. In addition, …rms start small and tend to grow over time. This should imply that for younger vintages employment levels near the lower boundaries are more likely. Moreover, if we were to include higher variance of growth rates for younger …rms, as occurs in the real world, the width of the bands would widen for youg …rms, generating higher implicit wedges. This would appear as taxation to employment, as younger …rms concentrate in the lower part of the sS band.
The potential e¤ect of inter-…rm distortions
In contrast to [Hopenhayn and Rogerson, 1993] where wedges arise as the result of a speci…c policy, the recent literature takes a more agnostic view and directly examines the e¤ects on productivity of di¤erent distributions of wedges. The …rst paper to do is [Restuccia and Rogerson, 2008] . Expanding the above model to include capital, distortions occur both as departures in the output of a …rm from its optimal value and the use of an ine¢ cient capital/labor ratio.
Restuccia-Rogerson
There is a …xed set (measure) of …rms with distribution of productivities calibrated to match US size distribution, taken as a benchmark for an undistorted economy. In the distorted economy, pro…ts for …rm i are given by: i = (1 i ) y i wn i (1 + ki ) rk i , where i and ki are two wedges wedges are distributed according to a conditional density ! ( ; k je) :
9 The exercise performed consists in taxing a subset of …rms and subsidizing the remaining set so that steady state capital remains invariant. We consider here quantitative results for level taxes only. Table 2 gives a summary of the e¤ects of distortions. The …rst two columns consider uncorrelated wedges and the remaining the correlated ones. Two observations follow: 1) correlated distortions have signi…cantly stronger e¤ects; 2) the impact on productivity is larger the higher is the fraction taxed. The latter can be explained by the fact that when a group of …rms is taxed, the remaining …rms are subsidized at a rate that makes total capital stock invariant. The larger the group taxed, the higher the subsidy has to be for the other group, thus creating a very large disparity in wedges. There is also an intuition for why correlated distortions have a bigger impact on TFP. In the extreme case where …rms have near constant returns to scale, there is no e¤ect of variance distortions as output can be totally reallocated within productivity groups. The same is not true with correlated distortions, as output is reallocated to …rms with lower productivity. In particular, when the 90% most e¢ cient …rms are taxed the lowest 10% receive a 107% subsidy when = 0:2 and 114% when = 0:4: The analysis done by Restuccia and Rogerson suggests that large inter…rm distortions can have substantial aggregate TFP e¤ects. But the distortions assumed are hypothetical. In contrast, [Hsieh and Klenow, 2009 ] derive these distortions from …rm level data.
Hsieh-Klenow The setting they consider is one of monopolistic competition. As mentioned in section 2.2, this is not a major di¤erence as for …xed number of …rms the model is isomorphic to the Lucas'style model. The major novelty in their approach is the exercise of recovering wedges from …rm level data. This can be explained easily in terms of the model developed in section 2. Measured TFP for each …rm i is simply e i = y i =n i :This requires measuring inputs and outputs (or sales).
10 . Leaving aside measurement er- Figure 6 : Distributions of Firm TFP ror, one can calculate aggregate TFP in an e¢ cient allocation using equation (3) as follows:
In contrast, actual TFP is given by
Hsieh and Klenow use …rm level data from US, China and India to perform these calculations. Figure 6 gives the empirical distribution of …rm level productivities e i as calculated by Hsieh and Klenow. The distribution for the US stochastically dominates that of China, which in turn stochastically dominates that of India -that also exhibits the highest levels of dispersionexcept for very high levels of productivity.
As seen in Section 2, in an e¢ cient allocation y i =n i is equated across …rms. The analogue for the output/labor ratio in Hsieh-Klenow is what in their paper is called TFPR (total factor productivity revenue.) The dispersion in ln TFPR across …rms (absent measurement error) is an aggregate measure of the level of inter-…rm distortions. Table 3 gives measures of dispersion of TFPR. All measures of dispersion, standard deviation, 75-25 percentiles and 90-10 percentiles show considerable higher dispersion for China and India than the US, indicating distortions are more important in these two countries.
In order to get a better idea of the nature of these distortions, we calculate the dispersion of implicit tax/subsidy rates would they imply. Assuming Cobb-Douglass production function with labor share 1 (as in [Hsieh and Klenow, 2009] ) and considering only level taxes, Table 4 converts the numbers in Table 3 into equivalent ratios of output taxes. For example, the value 2.6 for China represents the ratio (1 25 ) = (1 75 ). This can be interpreted as follows: assuming the decile 25 corresponded to no taxes, decile 25 would have a subsidy of 160%, or assuming decile 25 had no subsidy, decile 75 would have a 61.5% tax on output. The comparison values for decile 90-10 are subsidies of 550% for decile 10 or taxes of approximately 85% for decile 90. These numbers are large, but they disregard measurement error, which could be quite large for several reasons. To get a relative expression, the table also gives relative ratios of taxes for China/US and India/US. For instance, for the 75-25 decile, China's distortion is 55% higher than in the US. If we considered US as the undistorted benchmark, the distortion for China would be equivalent to subsidizing 55% …rms in percentile 25 (of the distribution of TFPR) if no tax were levied on percentile 75.
How much can these distortions explain of the current di¤erences in TFP? To answer that question, Hsieh and Klenow perform the following counterfactual experiment. Take the case of China and the US, where the current gap is equal to T F P china =T F P us : Now suppose both countries eliminated all distortions, equating TFPR's across …rms. The new ratio T F P ef f icient China =T F P ef f icient us would still be less than one, since as we have seen in Figure 6 the distribution of …rm level TFP in the US stochastically dominates that of China. A measure of how much closer is the TFP is to calculate what percentage of the gap was closed:
The same calculation was done for India. Values for China range from 30 to 50% and for India from 40 to 60%, depending on the years considered.
Distortions and the distribution of Productivities
The decomposition in [Hsieh and Klenow, 2009] separates the role of di¤er-ences in the distribution of …rm level productivities and inter…rm misallocations as two separate sources of aggregate TFP di¤erences. This might be a useful taxonomy, but misses the fact that these two sources are likely to be interrelated. Recent papers in Economic Development have emphasized this connection.
[?], solve for a steadty state joint distribution of entrepreneurial talent and wealth in an economy where entrpreneurs must self-…nance their investments. This joint distribution implies, both, a distribution of productivities and a distribution of wedges. Policies or institutions that relax the borrowing constraints should imply smalle wedges and a stronger selection e¤ect by which low productivity entrepreneurs are driven out of production.
[?] and [?] examine the link between borrowing constraints and technology selection. As borrowing constraints are relaxed, …rms can adopt more productive technologies that to be pro…table require a considerably larger scale and investment.
Firm demographics and TFP
In this section we explore a di¤erent application of …rm microstructure to macroeconomics: the importance of …rm heterogeneity and growth for ag-gregate adjustment dynamics. The mechanism described here is one of propagation The link that we explore in this section, is that the distribution of …rm productivities depends on the age distribution of …rms -what we called …rm demographics-and is thus a¤ected by the path of …rm creation. Letting (a) denote the fraction of …rms of age a; we can rewrite total productivity as a weighted average of age-cohort tfp's:
How does TFP evolve as a cohort ages? In our model, there is a one-one mapping between the distribution of productivities and …rm sizes and it is a well established fact that the size distribution of …rms increases stochastically with the age of a cohort. This implies, through the lens of this model, a stochastic increase in productivities and thus a rise over time in the average productivity of a given cohort of entrants. There are two forces that suggest this is to be expected: learning by doing and selection. The …rst has been emphasized considerably in the IO literature. The idea of selection and its role for increasing …rm size is also well established in the literature after Jovanovic's classic paper.
The average size of entrants is about 20% the average size of incumbent …rms. Since e i =e j = (n i =n j ) , using a value of = 1=3 this is consistent with a ratio in average productivity close to two. This does not take into account the increase in the variance of …rm sizes with age, which applying Jensen's inequality to the term in brackets in the last line of equation (11) gives a further contribution to the average productivity of a cohort. These observations imply that, a shock to entry will lead to a decrease in productivity and a further rise.
11 In what follows, we examine two applications of this idea. 
Shakeout of …rms
This section describes work in [Hopenhayn, 1993] . It is a fairly well established fact that as a new industry progresses through its life cycle, it experiences an increase and then a big fall in the number of …rms as it approaches maturity. ( [Gort and Klepper, 1982] document this shakeout to be in the order of 40% and describe 5 stages in the life cycle of an industry.) Table 5 documents some of the key factors extracted from the dataset used by Gort and Klepper. In the …rst stage, there are very few …rms in the industry and output is very low. The second stage exhibits an exponential growth in the number of …rms and a very high growth in total output, which slows down over the remaining stages. The third stage has little net entry and is where the peak number of …rms is reached. The fourth stage is the shakeout, with a severe drop in the number of …rms that can add to more than 50%. Note that the shakeout is not explained by a decay in the industry as total output continues to grow at a rate of 8% per year. [Hopenhayn, 1993] provides the following explanation. For whatever reason, either because of a slowdown in demand growth or in technological change, Table 5 shows a slowdon in the rate of growth of the industry output over time. This leads to a slowdown in the entry of …rms. As this happens and the large cohorts of …rms that entered earlier become older, there is a change in the demographics of the industry, increasing the share of older …rms. This results in a rise in average productivity and the size of …rms, and thus a smaller number of …rms are needed to clear the product market. [Hopenhayn, 1993] shows that this theory not only …ts the facts qualitatively, but it also does a good job on the quantitative side.
To get an idea of the quantitative power of this e¤ect, take a calibrated model as the one described in the paper of [Hopenhayn and Rogerson, 1993] . Consider demand growth as the source of expansion in the industry. Suppose Figure 7 : Shakeout of Firms that demand grows at a decreasing rate following a Gompertz process, which is commonly used to model di¤usion, and parametrize the model so it takes 40 years for the industry to reach 90% of its limiting total demand. Figure  5 depicts the evolution of total demand (and output) as the dashed line and the number of …rms as the solid line. It can be seen that the number of …rms peaks around period 30, then there is is a shakeout and the number of …rms drops by 36% [Hopenhayn, 1993] uses data on price decreases to calibrate a process of cost reducing technological change which is taken as the driving force for industry expansion. The slowdown in entry is triggered by a slowdown in the rate of technological change coupled with a decrease in demand elasticity as the market expands.
Firm demographics and the productivity paradox
This section considers an application of the same idea to explain a productivity paradox during the second industrial revolution (1860-1900) studied by [Atkeson and Kehoe, 2007] . There was a 50 year lag between an increase [Atkeson and Kehoe, 2007] gives account of the slow increase in productivity growth.
The authors link the productivity paradox with the slow di¤usion of new technologies that had been documented in [Devine Jr, 1983] . This is illustrated in Figure 9 , reproduced from their paper. Atkeson and Kehoe provide a model similar to the one described above to explain this slow di¤usion process with the following elements: 1) it takes time for new …rms to learn a new technology and 2) new technologies are embodied in new …rms. From a modeling perspective, this is tantamount to assuming that the distribution of a cohort's productivity stochastically increases through time (as we did in Section 7.1) and that the technological frontier that is embodied in new …rms grows at a constant rate. In the long run, the model delivers a stationary equilibrium along a balanced growth path that is very similar to the one described in Section 3. In what follows, we describe a similar model from Hopenhayn (1989, chapter 3) .
The production function of a cohort of time t entrants is given by t e i n i ; where 1 0 is the rate of technological progress. Productivity shocks Figure 9 : Di¤usion of electric motors e i at time of entry are drawn from a distribution with c.d.f. G(e) and then follow a Markov process with conditional distribution F (e 0 je) as described in Section 3. In addition, …rms face a …xed cost f (in terms of labor) that is used to generate endogenous exit as in [Hopenhayn, 1992a] . In a balanced growth path, the wage rises at the rate of technological progress, so w t = t w 0 : The value of a …rm of age is given by: v e; t w 0 = max 0; e; t w 0 + Ev e 0 ; t+1 w 0 je where (e; w) = max n en wn wf:
It is immediate that is homogeneous of degree one in e; w and easy to show that so is v . So dividing through by t v e; t w 0 = t v 0 (t ) e; w 0 = t max 0; 0 (t ) e; w 0 + t Ev (t ) e 0 ; w 0 je and thus v 0 (t ) e; w 0 = max 0; 0 (t ) e; w 0 + Ev (t ) e 0 = ; w 0 je :
Letting the state of a …rmẽ = (t ) e; this value function can be rewritten as:
v 0 (ẽ; w 0 ) = max (0; 0 (ẽ; w 0 ) + Ev (ẽ= ; w 0 je)) :
This is exactly the same as the value function for a …rm in a stationary economy with no technological change with an appropriate shift in the conditional distribution of productivityF (ẽ 0 jẽ) = F ( ẽ 0 jẽ): The equilibrium is solved exactly as in the model with no growth.
This shift introduces a depreciating element to a …rm's productivity as it ages and falls further behind the technological frontier. There are now two forces working in opposite directions: the original property of the Markov process by which the distribution of a cohort's productivity increases with the age of the cohort (what [Atkeson and Kehoe, 2007] call learning) and the counteracting force introduced by technological depreciation. These two forces determine the sequence of age-cohort productivities fA a g 1 a=0 and in particular imply that A a+1 =A a < : This is important for transitional dynamics. Start the economy in the steady state corresponding to a low 0 and consider a permanent increase increase to > 0 : There will be a jump in the entry rate that will shift the demographics to lower ages. Though these new entrants embody the new technology, the average productivity of the cohort will does not fully re ‡ect the higher productivity of the new technology, so average productivity will grow less than (it could even fall!). As time goes by the economy converges (from below) to a balanced growth path where output and productivity grow at the new rate : In their calibrated model, [Atkeson and Kehoe, 2007] show that these forces can explain quite well the productivity paradox.
Final remarks
This paper examined the links between …rm microstructure and aggregate productivity. Recent empirical work documenting the importance of productive heterogeneity and reallocation have increased the awareness among macroeconomists of the importance of looking under the hood of the aggregate production function. The development of parsimonious models of …rm microstructure with very simple aggregation properties have contributed importantly to this very active research area. I have reviewed these basic models and some of the most important applications abstracting from many details and leaving aside other very important considerations and contributions. I will comment brie ‡y on some important ommitted topics.
Our analysis has taken mostly as given the technological frontier or taken an exogenously given process of improvement. Research and Development and Innovation have been very important topics of research both in IO and Macroeconomics. As indicated by our analysis in Appendix 9, the area of Economic Development, Technological Change and Growth is the second largest overlap between IO and Macro research. Starting with [?] , macroeconomists have been trying to understand better the forces behind economic growth. R&D has been and continues to be an important question in IO and there has been a great amount of research in this area. On the empirical side, [?] very in ‡uential paper developed the idea of measuring a …rm's R&D stock as a determinant of productivity. On the theory side, there has been considerable attention on patent races and the timing of innovations (see [?] ). From a regulation perspective, a large literature has also focused on patent design. The question about the incidence of competition and market structure on innnovation is a very important one that is at the center of both IO and Macro. Indeed, since [?] , the idea of creative destruction as a major source of productivity growth has played a prominent role.
[?] is the …rst paper to incoporate this idea into a general equilibrium macro model to understand the connection between innovation and growth. This is a very active area of research in the boundary of IO and Macro with great promise.
I have also abstracted from strategic considerations, that might play an important role in explaining productivity. This is an area of obvious relevance to IO, but one of considerable complexity. It has prompted severecriticisms to IO theory for its lack of general predictions and robustness that [Peltzman, 1991] well described as "theoretical chaos" There are two responses to this criticsm. One is to try to keep models at the simplest possible level, abstracting from complex strategic considerations and trying to focus on results that might have general application. This has been the direction followed by [?] that advance the idea of endogenous/strategic sunk costs as an important determinant of market structure. In the model presented above, exogenous sunk costs play an important role as a barrier to entry and can have a major impact on aggregate productivity. But if strategic sunk costs play an even more prominent role in detering entry, this should be a eustion of major interest to macroeconomists. This is de…nitely an area that should receive important contributions in the near future. Following [?], a second response to theoretical chaos has been to focus on Markov perfect equilibria of a dynamic game. This research is usually tied to structural estimation and has concentrated on somewhat narrow analysis of industries that do not easily aggregate into general insights of use in macroeconomics.
Needless to say, a very important area to analyze the importance of the …rm microstructure for the aggregate economy is measurement. As an example, measuring …rm level productivity is a complex task given the endogeneous nature of input choices. Starting with the work of [?] , this question has received considerable attention. The availability of new longitudinal databases, such as the LBD and the role of the Bureau of the Census data centers in facilitating the access of this data to researchers is of considerable importance. These are very exciting times for research at the boundary of IO and macro. It is an opportunity for IO economists interested in broadening perspectives to look into macro/development/international applications and more macroeconmists to look into IO. Central questions in economics such as the need for a better understanding of the determinants of productivity, innovation and growth are at the core of these two …elds. I took a random sample of articles published between 1992 and 2010 in Rand Journal and Journal of Monetary Economics (JME), the two top …eld journals in IO and macro, respectively. We classi…ed each of the papers in the sample -330 from RAND out of 761 published and 300 in JME out of 1234 -according to JEL codes, averaging between two and three codes per paper. Figure ? ? provides a distribution of the relative shares of JEL codes in IO and Macro, ordered from left to right by the relative importance of IO. Excluding the small share codes, we can do the following classi…cation: impression on the nature of the intersection it is useful to look at sub…elds within these JEL aggregates. These are ordered in Table 6 taking the minimum of the frequencies in Rand and in JME as a measure of intersection.
